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Abstract 
 
This study examines R&D-alliances in the biotech sector, where they are 
particularly prevalent. A novel typology is offered of different alliance types, 
based on a two-dimensional distinction between partners, by their value-chain 
position, and the direction of alliance deliverables. Using a unique dataset 
covering all firms specialised in Drug Discovery (DDFs) in Denmark and Sweden 
in the 1997 to 2004 timeframe, we measure financial performance by the value 
achieved by the DDF in the financing round immediately subsequent to alliance 
formation and find divergent effects on financial performance across alliance 
types.  
Prior literature has given particular attention to those alliances with 
large pharmaceutical partners which DDFs enter to collaborate on and to out-
license projects from their pipeline. Based on property rights arguments prior 
studies found that such alliances entered by DDFs subject to capital scarcity 
detract from their value. We find capital scarcity to have the opposite effect, and 
offer the explanation that each advance in a drug development project notably 
increases its value, hence incentivizing the DDF to strain its financial resources to 
take the project as far as possible before out-licensing it to a pharma partner. For 
this reason, capital scarcity emerges as the condition, under which pharma 
alliances are brought to higher levels of value. Concurrently, as financial 
resources approach exhaustion, the DDF must attract the interest of a pharma-
partner with requisite needs. These requirements translate into a complex 
alignment of burn rates, research achievements and search for best match amongst 
potential pharma partners. Therefore the capability of a Top Management Team 
(TMT) to produce this alignment at the right time is exposed to investors more 
clearly as an attribute of alliances subject to capital scarcity. The resultant 
increase in investor confidence in the TMT is an additional factor behind the 
comparatively higher valuations produced by alliances entered under conditions 
of scarcity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The authors are grateful for contributions from 
Toke Reichstien to the regression models presented in this paper.  
 
 
 
 
A separate document, WP  2007 – 01 –B,  presents more detailed descriptions of 
the alliances analysed in this paper. See Appendix B, “Descriptive data on 
alliances of Danish and Swedish biotech firms” at   
http://www.biotechbusiness.dk/publications.htm   
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1 Introduction 
This study examines how the financial performance of biotech firms is affected by 
the R&D-alliances they form with other organisations. 
Innovating firms increasingly collaborate to access complementary knowledge, 
competences, technologies or financing, or to reduce development time, save 
costs or reduce risks (Bartezzaghi and Corso, 1997; Quinn, 2000). For this set of 
objectives alliances combine the advantages of firm-internal coordination with the 
efficiency of markets. Hence they are often referred to as ‘hybrids’ (Williamson, 
1975; Williamson, 1985), ‘quasi-integrations’ (Blois, 1972), conceptually located 
between integrated firms and arms’-length market relationships.  
The literature on alliances primarily has focused on bringing out and explaining 
these beneficial effects of alliances on innovations (Shan and Walker, 1994; 
Powell, 1998; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Chang, 2003). Quite few studies have 
addressed the next causal step how alliances affect the financial performance of 
firms. Using a unique database on Scandinavian biotech firms this paper focuses 
on identifying and explaining these financial effects.   
The paper begins with a brief review of the literature on alliances and their 
significance for biotech firms. Section 3 presents conceptualisation and definition 
of the two key concepts of alliances and financial performance. Hypotheses are 
developed in section 4, followed by an account of the empirical method. Results 
are presented in Section 6, followed by discussion and comments on findings in 
Section 7. Conclusions are brought in Section 8.  
2 Alliances in biotech start-ups  
Alliances and other types of inter-organisational collaboration are essential for the 
biotech industry because of its rapid technological development (Bartholomew, 
1997), long development times, complex set of capabilities, and substantial 
financial requirements (Terziovski and Morgan, 2006; Tyebjee and Hardin, 2004). 
Research on strategic alliances in the biotech industry demonstrates that alliances 
enhance innovations (Shan and Walker, 1994; Powell, Koput, Smith-Doerr, 1996; 
Powell, 1998; Kotabe and Swan, 1995; Deeds and Hill, 1996; Chang, 2003). The 
number of alliances in the biotech industry has dramatically increased from being 
almost non-existing in the 1970, to account for approximately 20% of alliances 
formed by all firms in all industries in the 1980s and 1990s (Hagedoorn, 2002; 
Hagedoorn, 1993).   
In addition to enhancing complex knowledge transfer and combining new bodies 
of knowledge, alliances may also open new opportunities of R&D funding, which 
for DDFs are closely related to the most essential factor for survival, namely 
external sources of R&D funding (Blakely, Roberts, Manidis, 1987). Basically, 
DDFs fund R&D activities by external capital infusions from venture capitalists 
or alliance partners. The vast majority of Scandinavian DDFs have no drugs on 
the market. Instead, they generate revenues from out-sourcing drug candidates 
from their pipeline to large pharmaceutical firms. The latter are in strong demand 
of such in-licensing arrangements. Declining R&D productivity, in combination 
with major patent expirations, generic competition and downward pricing 
4 
 
pressure, make pharmaceutical firms increasingly keen on allying with DDFs to 
acquire new projects (Valentine, 2003). Pharmaceutical firms exhibit an extensive 
internal expertise, enabling them to absorb knowledge developed in DDFs. In 
combination with their financial resources, they become important partners for 
collaboration with DDFs (Senker and Sharp, 1997).  
DDFs out-licensing technologies or projects to pharmaceutical firms are typically 
receiving upfront payments and royalties on future development and successful 
commercialisation. Frequently an equity investment from the pharma partner also 
is part of the compensation. These financial contributions from pharma partners 
often are crucial for the further development of DDFs s. They are particularly 
important for DDFs in the early stages of the drug discovery cycle and for clinical 
trials requiring sizable expenditures. 
At the same time out-licensing a drug-candidate to a pharmaceutical partner also 
implies a significant loss of potential future earnings for the DDF. The value of a 
drug candidate increases by orders or magnitude for every stage a DDF manages 
to take it through clinical trials. Out-licensing a drug candidate therefore implies 
that the DDF foregoes a substantial part of its future value. Pharmaceutical firms 
are in a strong position to select promising candidates and have been shown to 
select candidates that are as potentially valuable as the candidates which DDFs 
take through the development cycle on their own (Nicholson, Danzon, 
McCullough, 2005). For many pharmaceutical firms in-licensing is as important 
as internal R&D (Valentine, 2003). Furthermore, DDFs also form alliances and 
licensing agreements to in-source knowledge and technologies, either from other 
DDFs or from upstream suppliers or academic research organisations. This type of 
alliances plays an important role in boosting the innovations performance but they 
also are significant cost-drivers for DDFs.  
For these reasons the technological and the financial aspects of alliances must be 
conceived as distinct dimensions. This is clearly brought out in (Baum, Calabrese, 
Silverman, 2000), which tracks Canadian biotech firms founded 1991-1996 over 
their first five years of operations, the same age-range characterizing also most of 
the firms in our dataset, identifying effects on both technology (innovation) and 
financial performance of the alliances initially formed by the firms at the time 
they were established. Whereas the authors find the technology domain to be 
notably influenced by alliances, financial performance (measured by yearly 
revenue) is affected to a more moderate extent and with a time lag of several 
years. Effects also differ across types of alliances, partnerships with 
pharmaceutical firms standing out from other alliance-types by generating 
revenue earlier and at a steeper rate. 
There is no simple relationship between the technological and the financial 
dimensions of DDF alliances. Achieving a productive relationship between these 
two dimensions is amongst the most challenging managerial issues for DDF 
managers.  
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2.1 Definitions  
Alliances are different from arms’-length market relationships and have been 
defined as “voluntary arrangements between firms involving exchange, sharing, 
or co-development of products, technologies, or services” (Gulati, 1998). 
We define an alliance as 1) formalised, medium to long term based recurrent 
exchange and collaboration between firms and organisations, 2) involving relation 
specific, irreversible investments, such as time, equipments, organizational 
changes, or financial transactions, 3) undertaking coordination of complementary 
resources and capabilities to achieve more than what may individually be 
achieved within the firms or with others, and 4) with ex-ante articulated strategic 
aim and commitments. The outcome may not, however, necessarily be known in 
advance, as characterises R&D activities in general. 
Licensees have the right to do what the legal owner of the patent, the licensor, 
could have prevented by an action for infringement in absence of licences (Byrne 
and McBratney, 2005). Licensees are not given any proprietary interests in 
patents.  Licenses may be exclusive, sole or non-exclusive (ibid.). Exclusive 
licenses refer to licenses where the licensor agrees 1) not to license any other in 
the territory of the licensee and 2) not to exploit it there himself. Sole licences 
include only the first covenant, while non-exclusive licenses include neither of 
them (ibid.). 
In research-based industries like biotechnology, alliances and licenses share some 
common elements, making them equally important when analysing the 
importance of external collaboration and agreements of DDFs. First, alliances and 
licenses give DDFs access to R&D output and technologies. Second, both are 
built upon ex-ante contracted knowledge and technology sharing. Third, both may 
include exclusivity in the sense that an alliance partner or license agreement may 
prohibit other firms access to collaboration or technologies. Fourth, both invoke 
coordination of complementary and supplementary technologies and, fifth, 
relation specific investments. Sixth, alliances and licenses may be used for either 
explorative or exploitative strategies. Finally, seventh, they are equally important 
for positive revenue streams and R&D funding of DDFs. 
For these reasons the paper combines the two arrangements. Unless otherwise 
specified, alliances below refers to arrangements both with and without a 
licensing component. 
 
3  Conceptualising financial performance and types of 
alliances 
3.1 Financial performance 
After start-up DDFs typically operate for years without profits, generating at best 
modest revenues. In stead they are financed by venture capital firms with equity, 
supplied in 1-2 years financing rounds, while they build op the value to be 
realised in an IPO or in an acquisition. As vehicles for inflows of knowledge and 
for outflows of project deals alliances have both long-term and short-term effects 
on the financial performance of DDFs. Long-term effect become visible at the 
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time of IPO. Short-term effects of alliances appear already when the DDF is up 
for re-financing, typically within one or two years after the alliance was formed.  
The present paper examines these short-term effects only, as indicated by the total 
value of the firm as per each financing round. This value is the key metric by 
which we observe the dependent variable of financial performance. Although 
formalities differ, publicly listed DDFs essentially are subject to the same 
conditions for mobilization of new capital until they become fully profitable 
firms.  
A key challenge for the Top Management Team (TMT) of DDFs is to navigate the 
firm towards improved valuations from one financing round to the next. In these 
rounds investors respond to the alliance based on their assessment of its potentials 
and implications for the DDF venture as a whole. The outcome of this assessment 
is far from self-evident, but it translates into the resources investors make 
available to the DDF, hence affecting its further development. That is exactly 
what makes it such a critical issue to identify patterns in the valuations made by 
investors in response to alliances formed prior to the investment round. The 
analysis presented in this section has been designed to address precisely that issue. 
Depending on their success in financing rounds and on their burn rate, firms are 
brought to operate at different levels of capital scarcity, affecting not only their 
propensity to enter new alliances, but also how defensive their position will be in 
defining their contracts. Therefore capital scarcity in our analysis is seen as an 
important mediating factor for the effect of an alliance on the valuation of the firm 
in its next financing round. 
The literature on alliances has given particular attention to partnerships with 
pharmaceutical firms, reflecting the vital role they play as downstream recipients 
of key outputs from DDFs. However, 
alliances frame important relationships 
also for inputs obtained by DDFs from 
upstream partners, and for the way 
DDFs connect to complementary 
resources residing in other, horizontally 
positioned, research firms. The analysis 
below considers effects on firm values of 
these different types of alliances, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
3.2 A two-dimensional typology of alliances 
To differentiate between different types of alliances we follow (Baum, Calabrese, 
Silverman, 2000) in differentiating by the position of partners in the value-chain, 
i.e. upstream, horizontal, and downstream positions relative to the focal DDF1.  
The position of alliance partners in the value chain is defined by the main 
activities of their respective organizations. Compared to previous studies we take 
a step further by combining the value-chain characteristic of the partner with the 
                                                 
1 In the majority of all alliances registered focal DDFs have only one partner, allowing alliances to 
be categorised unambiguously by partner type. In the few cases of multiple partners each dyadic 
partner relationship of the focal DDF has been identified individually. 
Alliances
Valuation of 
focal DDF
Figure 1:  Key elements in the analysis
Output
Focal 
DDF
Input
Comple-
mentarity
Capital 
scarcity
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direction of alliance deliverables into inflows, outflows and collaborative 
(reciprocal) flows.  
This two-dimensional distribution of alliances, using both value-chain attributes 
and directionality, is introduced to avoid loss of pertinent information from simply 
conflating the two. In the case of horizontally positioned partners it is less 
surprising that the direction of the alliances includes all three possible directions 
of in-licensing, out-licensing as well as two-way collaborative flows. Less self-
evidently, the same multi-directionality also is found for upstream and 
downstream partners. E.g. pharma partners are positioned downstream from focal 
DBF and consistent with that they also are primarily recipients of out-sourced 
deliverables from DDFs. However, pharmaceutical firms integrate multiple 
activities, including discovery research. Results from this research, and the 
specialized tools developed for its pursuit, in a fair amount of cases are in-sourced 
by the DDFs, i.e. generating cases of in-licensing from downstream partners. 
Similar variations are found in the alliances, which focal DDFs establish with 
upstream partners.  
This two-dimensional differentiation of alliances is addressed in the four-fold 
typology of alliances submitted here. The four alliance types, seen from the 
perspective of the focal DDF are illustrated in Figure 2. Out of the total 430 
alliances recorded for Danish and Swedish DDFs we have data on 285 alliances 
allowing us to divide them into this four-fold categorisation. The number of cases 
identified for each of the four types is indicated in their respective boxes in Figure 
2. The four types are defined as follows: 
1) Upstream Input alliances (UPSTRIN) are formed with partners positioned 
upstream from the focal DDF, found in 25% of all alliances (71 cases). They 
either are supplier firms (e.g. research services or instrumentation), university 
departments, university hospitals, or public research organisations. DDFs source 
deliverables from these partners primarily through R&D collaboration (66 cases), 
while only 5 cases are in-license agreements. 
2) Complementary Input alliances (COMPLIN) are formed with partners either 
positioned horizontally or downstream from the focal DDF, characterising 88 
cases, 31% of all alliances. Horizontal partnerships predominate (55 cases), i.e. 
alliances formed with other DDFs, or firms from the slightly broader category of 
DDFs2. All 33 cases of downstream partnerships are with pharmaceutical firms. 
Alliances with horizontal partners take the form either of R&D collaborations or 
of in-license agreements. Alliances with pharmaceutical firms are included in this 
category only when the focal firm is in an in-licensing position. COMPLIN 
alliances, in other words, include only alliances in which the focal DDF is in the 
recipient’s position, either in a symmetrical collaborative relationship, or in an in-
licensing mode.  
3) Symmetrical Output alliances (OUTSYM) characterise 80 cases (14% of the 
total) and refers to alliances in which DDFs out-license deliverables to 
horizontally positioned (31 cases) or to upstream partners (9 cases). The output 
                                                 
2 I.e. other firms heavily based on biotech R&D, but not necessarily focused on drug discovery. 
For a mode detailed distinction see chapter 1.3 in  (Valentin, Dahlgren, and Jensen 2006) . 
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delivered may be, for instance, access to research platforms or out-licensed 
projects. The nature of these partnerships suggest that deliverables involve access 
to drug candidates in early stages or research tools developed by the focal DDF, in 
this sense building on SYMmetrical positions of the two partners, as indicated in 
the acronym. 
4) Non-symmetrical Output alliances (OUTNONSYM) are formed by DDFs with 
downstream pharmaceutical firms, found in 60 cases (25% of the total) Two thirds 
of these alliances are out-licensing arrangements, while the rest are R&D collabo-
rations. The deliverable from the DDFs is typically either an out-licensed drug 
candidate, or a specified access to its research platform To focus OUTNONSYM 
on the output dimension we 
exclude alliances in which the 
focal DDF in-licenses from a 
pharmaceutical firm 
(categorised instead in 
COMPLIN). The financial and 
technological strength of 
pharma-partners ex ante 
positions put them in a 
powerful, NON-SYMmetrical 
position as partners for DDFs, 
as reflected in the acronym.  
4 Hypotheses 
4.1 Effects of outflow alliances 
Outflow alliances with pharma partners - the 99 OUTNONSYM alliances 
identified in Figure 2 - are based primarily on out-licensing with only 1/3 of the 
cases being collaborations without a licensing component. The literature suggests 
that these alliances could be analysed from the three perspectives of i) property 
rights, ii) effects of value depletion, and iii) challenges encounter in obtaining 
strategic alignment of key processes in the DDF. We present argument and 
specify hypothesis in favour of each of these perspectives.  
i) In a property rights perspective research, the core activity of DDFs, has 
attributes rendering contracts between investors and DDFs incomplete, non-
verifiable and non-enforceable (Klein, Crawford, Alchian, 1978; Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1988). Based on this property rights 
approach, (Aghion and Tirole, 1994) argues that the optimal strategy is to assign 
property and decision rights of R&D projects to the firm with the highest marginal 
ability to affect the outcome of the R&D activities, i.e. R&D projects will be most 
efficient if assigned to DDFs. (Lerner, Shane, Tsai, 2003) apply the Aghion and 
Tirole model on R&D alliances, arguing that small biotechnology firms have 
stronger bargaining power in periods when sufficiently supplied with capital and 
weak bargaining power in periods of financial scarcity. With stronger bargaining 
power pharmaceutical firms will retain the rights to projects, hence separating 
property rights from the highest marginal ability to affect the outcome of the R&D 
activities, hence causing the allocation to become inefficient. Lerner et al. find 
Type of deliverable 
and their direction 
relative to focal firm
In-licensing
Collaborative 
Out-licensing 
Upstream Horizontal Downstream
P a r t n e r     t y p e s 
COMPLIN
OUTSYM
OUT 
NON 
SYM
UPSTRIN
Figure 2.  Visualisation of alliance typology, based on value chain position 
of partners and direction of deliverables
71 80
60
40
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that technology alliance agreements between small biotechnology firms and larger 
pharmaceutical corporations signed during periods of limited external equity 
financing are more likely to assign the bulk of the control to the larger corporate 
partner. From these findings we infer that the value of a biotech firm revealed in a 
first financing round subsequent to such a deal is adversely affected by this loss of 
control.  
 
HYP 1:   Collaborative and out-licensing alliances with pharma partners 
(OUTNONSYM) entered by DDFs subject to capital scarcity lowers 
firm value in the next capital round. 
 
ii) The value depletion perspective is less clearly articulated in the literature. Its 
point of departure lies in observations that when projects reach later development 
stages firms prefer to fund R&D projects by use of internal resources rather than 
external equity (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). The reason is that every successful 
step towards commercialisation dramatically increases the value of the drug 
candidate, and in turn also of the company (Ely, Simko, Thomas L.G, 2003). 
Therefore when DDFs in alliances hand over rights to portions of their pipeline to 
pharma partners they forego the future value they would have obtained if having 
remained in full control of the projects. The large role played by project deals in 
the overall financing of DDFs (Lerner and Merges, 1998) demonstrate the 
significance of this mechanism. Given their specialised expertise pharmaceutical 
firms, as compared to venture capitalists, are less restrained by information 
asymmetries, and the projects they acquire from DDFs have been shown to be as 
valuable as the drug candidates kept by the DDFs for their own pursuit 
(Nicholson, Danzon, McCullough, 2005).  
Outflow alliances with pharma partners (OUTNONSYM) therefore, from the 
perspective of the venture capitalist, represent value depletion of the DBF, 
reducing the potential future value of the investment. Alliances entered 
specifically under conditions of sufficient capital supply offers little justification 
for this depletion. Investors therefore tend to see them as inconsistent with their 
investment objectives. Directly opposite the prediction derived from the property 
rights argument, investors by the value depletion argument respond to 
OUTNONSYM alliances subject to capital sufficiency by lowering the value of the 
DDF in the next financing round.  
HYP 2:   Collaborative and out-licensing alliances with pharma partners 
(OUTNONSYM) entered by DDFs subject to capital sufficiency lowers 
firm value in the next capital round. 
 
iii) If reduced valuations, as conjectured in HYP 2, are the response to alliances 
entered under sufficiency, not under scarcity, then how do investors respond to 
alliances subject to capital scarcity? The fact that each stage forward of a drug 
development project notably increases its value arguably provides a strong 
incentive for the DDF to strain its financial resources to take the project as far as 
possible before out-licensing it to a pharma-partner. By implication, capital 
scarcity becomes the condition under which a DDF maximizes returns on a 
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subsequent pharma-alliance. Timing this accomplishment to occur right before a 
new financing round is likely to favourably affect investors for two reasons. First, 
the higher proceeds from the alliance strengthen the DDF and alleviate its need 
for further investments to become fully profitable. Second, to achieve this timing 
the DDF not only must successfully complete the project at the point in time when 
its financial resources approaches exhaustion, but must also identify and target a 
pharmaceutical firm with requisite needs as a suitable alliance partner. This 
translates into an exceedingly complex alignment of burn rates, research 
achievements and identification of potential partners. In theoretical terms, it calls 
for a blending of two styles of innovation management by (Eisenberg and Tabrizi, 
1995) referred to as “compression” and “the experiential strategy”. The former is 
focused on innovation timing by coordination and shortening of well-known 
elements of the development process. The latter is about building flexible options 
and learning quickly in uncertain and shifting problem environments.  
Alliances revealing this alignment of diverse strategic processes give investors 
confidence in the TMT of the biotech venture, and will affect their subsequent 
value. This gives rise to the third hypothesis.   
 
HYP 3:   Collaborative and out-licensing alliances with pharma partners 
(OUTNONSYM) entered by DDFs subject to capital scarcity induce 
higher values in the next capital round compared to effects of alliances 
entered subject to capital sufficiency.  
 
iv) Will the same effect appear for out-licensing to other types of partners than 
pharmaceutical firms? In the four-fold typology OUTSYM combines out-licensing 
to other DDFs and to upstream partners. Prior research has not addressed how 
valuations respond to out-licensing arrangements with these types of partners. 
Their value chain position indicates that the focal DDF in these alliances either 
offers access to parts of its research platforms, or it out-licenses rights to drug 
candidates at an early, pre-clinical stages of their development cycle while their 
high risk of failure makes them affordable for other DDFs. In either case license 
fees are much smaller compared to what DDFs obtain in alliances with pharma-
partners on more mature drug candidates.  
Consequently, testing the effects on DDF values of OUTSYM primarily clarifies 
of if investors respond positively also to this, comparatively smaller, generation of 
revenue.  
 
HYP 4:   Out-licensing from a focal DDF to other DDFs and to upstream 
partners (OUTSYM) positively affects subsequent firm value of the focal 
DDF. 
  
4.2 Effects of input alliances 
We analyse input alliances grouped into two categories, the first of which focuses 
on in-licensing and collaborative agreements with upstream partners (UPSTRIN). 
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The second category (COMPLIN) includes similar in-licensing and collaborative 
agreements, but here they are formed with other biotech firms or with 
pharmaceutical firms. The latter are included since their deliverables in these 
alliances come out of their discovery and pre-clinical research, i.e. the very 
activities, which most resemble those also carried out by DDFs.  
From all three types of partners DDFs may get access to or collaborate their way 
towards critical inputs. However, COMPLIN alliances share the additional 
characteristic that DDFs here relate to partners carrying out essentially similar 
activities. That significantly increases risks of involuntary spill-overs and leakage 
of critical information (Hamel, 1991; Williamson, 1991). 
Do investors in their valuation give emphasis to the positive potentials of the 
deliverables obtained in the alliance, or do they focus on the potential significant 
loss incurred from leakage of critical information? Based on the latter argument 
prior research (Baum, Calabrese, Silverman, 2000) found that complementary 
alliances is the alliance-type with the most negative effects on the subsequent 
financial performance of firms. On this basis the hypothesis is as follows:  
 
HYP 5:   Complementary in-put alliances  (COMPLIN) negatively affect the 
value of the focal DDF in its next financing round.  
 
Upstream partners in two thirds of the cases are research organizations 
(universities, PROs or research hospitals), while the remaining one third are 
supplier firms (e.g. of commercial research services, instrumentation etc.). In both 
cases they are specialized in activities unsuited for exploitation of whatever 
leakage and spill-overs may emerge in their relationship with the focal DDF. On 
this basis, investors see them as less risky partners, expectedly not triggering the 
same downward effects on valuations as was hypothesized for COMPLIN 
alliances.  
On the contrary, collaboration with academic research expands the discovery 
capability of the firm (Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, Brewer, 1996), and has been 
shown in previous studies to positively affect the financial performance of firms 
(Xu, 2006; Baum, Calabrese, Silverman, 2000). In this function it substitutes for 
research which to a large extent could have been carried out internally in DDFs, 
as reflected in the findings of prior research that increase in academic 
collaboration does not generate parallel growth in internal R&D staff of biotech 
firms (Baum, Calabrese, Silverman, 2000). We therefore expect investors to 
respond to UPSTRIN alliances based primarily on the financial maneuverability 
available to the firm, eliciting negative valuations if undertaken under sufficient 
capital supply, when firms have resources to handle research internally. Under 
capital scarcity, on the other hand, investors appreciate the outsourcing of 
research as a financially less demanding alternative ( Aghion, Dewatripont, and 
Stein 2005).  
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HYP 6:    Input alliances with upstream partners (UPSTRIN) entered by DDFs subject 
to capital scarcity induce higher firm values in the next capital round 
compared to effects of same type of alliances entered subject to capital 
sufficiency. 
  
5 Empirical method  
5.1 Data   
This study draws on data extracted from SCANBIT (Scandinavian Biotech), a 
proprietary database developed and maintained by Research Centre on Biotech 
Business at Copenhagen Business School3. Using the firm as its unit of analysis 
SCANBIT, for all Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian biotech firms, integrates data 
on alliances, patenting, project pipeline, investments, financial performance and a 
range of additional variables. Data are updated on a yearly basis, for most firms 
providing coverage for all years since their establishment. A detailed presentation 
of SCANBIT and its coverage of DDFs in Scandinavia is available in . 
In Denmark 49 DDFs operated in 2004, while the corresponding number for 
Sweden was 42. This report is based on these 91 firms plus 7 additional firms 
established in the same period, but closed down prior to 2004. 
Most of the Danish firms came into existence in the four-year period 1999-2002 
while the age structure of the Swedish segment is slightly older.  The present 
study draws on data from SCANBIT covering the alliances, established by Danish 
and Swedish DDFs with other firms and organizations in the period 1997-2004. 
SCANBIT’S data on alliances were retrieved from the following sources: 1) press 
clippings, 2) annual reports, 3) homepages, and 4) databases on projects in pre-
clinical and clinical stages. The latter were consulted to see if they entailed joint 
work in the form of an alliance, typically involving a pharmaceutical firm as 
partner to the focal DDF. Inter-organisational agreements identified in these 
sources as meeting the above defining criteria of alliances were included in the 
dataset. That is, inter-organisational relationships characterised by formalised 
medium to long term based, recurrent exchange and collaboration with ex-ante 
articulated strategic aim and commitments between firms and organisations, 
involving relation specific investments, coordination of complementary resources 
and capabilities. The definition was operationalised  to include 1) formalised, 
medium to long term recurrent collaborations or license agreements, 2) type and 
purpose of collaboration and 3) aim and commitments of collaboration partners. 
Using this procedure alliance data were retrieved back to 1980s. The present study 
goes back only to 1997, when systematic data becomes available on other aspects 
of DDFs required for more informative tabulations. At the other end of the 
timeframe, 2004 is the latest year for which data may be exhaustively updated.  
Throughout the study, dates for alliances refer to the year in which they were 
established. A total of 430 alliances are recorded for this eight years period. Still, 
the sources from which we have retrieved alliances data in many cases provide 
only incomplete information.  
                                                 
3  See further www.cbs.dk/biotech and www.biotechbusiness.dk 
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5.2 Analytical design 
To test the hypotheses developed above we build a panel dataset for the period 
1997-2004 for the 98 DDF identified above as active during all or parts of that 
time-span. Firm value in yeart is examined for the influence of alliances entered in 
yeart or yeart-1, subject to capital scarcity for the DDF at the time of alliance 
formation. 
Scarcity is calculated from the amount raised by the focal DDF in its financing 
round in yeart-1, while firm value is calculated as postmoney value (PMV) per the 
financing round yeart (details of both calculations are explained below). In other 
words, a maximum of two years separates the two financing rounds from which 
metrics are extracted critical to our argument, requiring us to be attentive to the 
actual sequence our data pick up between independent variables (alliances and 
scarcity in particular) and the dependent variable (PMV).  
To control this sequence we restrain the dataset to include alliances t-1 for a given 
firm only if the firms undertakes financing round in t-1, (allowing capital scarcity 
to be calculated for that specific year) and if in the subsequent yeart it carries out a 
second financing round (from which the dependent variable of PMVt is 
calculated). In other words a maximum of two years separates the two financing 
rounds. The average interval observed between financing rounds for all firms 
across the 1997-2004 interval is 1.4 years. Firms entering an alliancet-1 expectedly 
bring their interval closer to the two years maximum, since the deal itself will 
postpone the need for new equity. By implication, these firms enter alliancest-1 
subsequent to the financing round t-1, hence also becoming subject to the level of 
capital scarcity brought about by that financing round.  
Alliancest, on the other hand, are included 
in the regressions restrained only by the 
requirement that the financing round from 
which PMVt is calculated also is carried 
out yeart, leaving the sequence of the two 
more ambiguous. Alliancest  entered prior 
to the financing roundt are straightforward, 
but alliances entered subsequently may 
affect the value of DDFs only by the 
expectation investors form about their 
outcome. This ambiguity in the causal 
paths connecting independent with 
dependent variables within yeart leads us 
to test hypotheses with reference only to alliances entered at t-1. However we 
bring estimates also for Alliancest.  Figure 3 illustrates these sequences of 
independent variables relative to the dependent variable of PMVt and also brings 
out key relationships examined in the models below. The combined effect of 
alliances entered under conditions of scarcity is tested in the regressions by 
interacting these two independent variables. 
t-1 t
Financing
roundt-1
Financing 
roundt
Capital 
Scarcity t-1
Alliancet-1
Valua-
tion t
Alliancet
time
Figure 3   Illustration of key relationships examined in 
regression models
Alliance x
scarcity inter    
action t-1
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5.3 Variables 
The dependent variable 
The DDFs in pharma discovery examined in this paper are financed primarily by 
venture capital and in most cases are not yet profitable. DDFs typically build 
value for years while operating without profits, and sometimes also without 
revenues, rendering conventional financial metrics inadequate. That is particularly 
so for firms in their early years (Hand, 2005), which pertains to the larger part of 
the firms in our dataset. To obtain a financial performance measure we use in 
stead the total value of the firm (PMV), which for unlisted firms may be 
calculated from their financing rounds. 
For firms listed on the stock exchange, the value per share is available on a daily 
basis. The share value for a given year is calculated as the average daily closing 
price per share for each firm, which reduces fluctuations during the year in the 
market assessment of firm values. For non-listed firms share values are based on 
the total amount invested in each round divided by the number of new shares 
committed. Only rounds involving new issued shares and capital increases with 
share premium are taken into account, to reduce the risk of biased and internal 
determination of share prices, resulting from converting debts or warrants 
exercised into share capital. New investments are assumed to better mirror a 
market assessment of the firm. 
The Postmoney value (PMV) refers to the total value of a firm. It is calculated as 
the share value multiplied by the total number of shares committed. For listed 
firms, PMV is the market capitalization value, calculated as the average daily 
closing price in each year for a given firm multiplied with the number of stocks 
committed. PMV for non-listed firms is calculated as share value multiplied by 
the total number of shares committed as per each round of capital inflow. This 
value corresponds to the amount an investor has to invest to acquire the whole 
firm if buying at the price resulting from the latest round.   
Independent variables 
Alliances 
Alliances are entered as independents for years t and t-1. In both cases all 
alliances per year are added up into the continuous variable of NEWALL. 
Alliances classified into the above four-fold categorization are entered as binary 
variables, i.e. identifying whether or not alliances of a given type is established in 
years t and t-1. We also enter the occurrence of the first alliance with a pharma-
partner established by a DDF  (PHf). 
Scarcity  
Financial scarcity of DDFs has been conceptualised in different ways in the 
literature. (Nicholson, Danzon, McCullough, 2005) measures scarcity as 
downward fluctuations in equity markets. For a study of Danish and Swedish 
biotech firms this approach has the drawback that the industry grew to its present 
size largely towards the end of the 1990s, so that the only large scale fluctuation 
occurring in the data is the collapse in 2001 of the high-tech bubble. For this 
reason scarcity conceptualised by downward fluctuation in the market leaves us 
15
 
with limited variation in the independent variable. At the same time it fails to pick 
up variations in scarcity experienced by different firms as effect of their individual 
ability to attract investments. 
(Lerner, Shane, Tsai, 2003) defines scarcity as a firm attribute by relating its R&D 
expenditures to prior year’s revenues, income, cash flow and assets. We adopt a 
similar approach, because it brings us closer to conceptualising scarcity in terms 
of the manoeuverability of the firm. Too few firms in our dataset have revenues of 
sufficient size to allow a replication of the method of Lerner et al. In stead, we 
utilise previous findings from analysis of the same data indicating fairly 
standardised costs per employee across firms . On this basis scarcity (Scarc) is 
defined as occurring for a firm when in a financing round its invested amount per 
employee is less than the average amount obtained per employee by all firms in 
their financing rounds the same year. It is a scarcity measure, in other words, 
which indicates whether a firm, as a consequence of its previous financing round, 
enters an alliance at a level of financial manoeuverability below or above the 
average manoeuverability for all firms at the same point in time. Scarct-1 signifies 
scarcity as an attribute of a financing round carried out in year t-1.      
Controls 
Four control variables are entered. First, we include a variable indicating whether 
the firm is listed on the stock exchange in year t (SX). Firms preparing an IPO 
indicate a group of firms performing above average. They might also get higher 
values as an effect of increasing transparency. Second, we include a control for 
the influence on firm value of general market fluctuation, by distinguishing 
between firm values before and after the year the collapse of the high-tech bubble 
hit Scandinavian biotechnology in 2001 (IndDev). Third, firm size is included to 
control for any effects related to size differences on formation of alliances. Fourth, 
the analysis also includes firm age to control for any effects of the changing 
alliance formation pattern in different age-groups as reported by the descriptive 
statistics in the previous section. Table 1 summarises all variables included in the 
analysis. 
 
*** Insert Table 1 here *** 
 
5.4 Descriptive statistics 
For each year we recorded values for the variables from the time the firm was 
active, generating a total of 683 annual observations for 108 firms.  Late entries 
and firms exiting the industry cause the unbalanced nature of the dataset. 
Prior to the regression analysis we studied the moments of these variables and 
identified 5 observations, which had PMV values exceeding 2,5 billion DKR. To 
avoid undue influence on results of a few extreme cases these observations were 
excluded.  
The analysis considers the simultaneous effects on PMV of a large number of 
variables, which in the end has the effect that only a reduced set of values on the 
dependent variables is explained, specifically 96 observations across 49 firms. 
The main reason for this reduction is the analytical model requiring annual 
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observations with alliances combined with subsequent years of recorded 
investment rounds. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics giving the mean and standard deviation of 
the values for each variable and, in addition, correlation estimates between the 
variables in the model. Due to few observations we have to leave out 
interpretation of the results for the dummy indicating when firms enter the pharma 
alliance (PHf).  
  
*** Insert Table 2 here *** 
 
5.5 Model 
PMV is by nature strictly positive. Often we see such variables inherit conditional 
distributions that are heteroscedastic or skewed which may lead to violation of the 
classical linear model assumptions. To mitigate this, we take the logarithm of 
PMV and use that as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficients should be 
interpreted accordingly. For a dummy variable the interpretation may be how the 
transformation from 0 to 1 influences the dependent in percentage terms rather 
than in level effects.  
The logarithm of PMV is a continuous variable characterised by being close to 
Gaussian distributed. The data is a panel dataset (longitudinal dataset) requiring a 
panel estimation technique. A simple regression analysis would possibly suffer 
from omitted variables problems. Put differently, there may be unobserved factors 
that influence the dependent variables and which may cause substantial bias in our 
estimations. Firm reputation, goodwill and pool of competencies are all possible 
unobserved heterogeneities that may cause bias in a standard OLS estimation 
method. We considered fixed effects and random effects model estimation to 
control for possible unobserved effects.4 We applied the (Hausman, 1978) 
specification test to compare the two model specifications. It suggested against 
random effects estimation and in favour of fixed effects estimation. Forthcoming 
regression model estimations are therefore of the fixed effects transformed model 
specification. 
We include late entries and the firms that exit the industry. We also have a certain 
number of missing values for some of our variables for particular observations 
which renders the panel unbalanced. The unbalanced nature of the dataset was 
studied with a (Heckman, 1979) selection analysis using the logarithm of size and 
the logarithm of age as explanatory variables in the selection equation. We found 
no significant bias in the estimates and hence find no reason to control for this in 
the estimations. 
To clean the analysis for any remaining heteroscedasticity effects, we ran the 
regressions with robust standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich 
estimator. Additionally, we tested the models for multicollinearity using variance 
                                                 
4 We also considered a first-differenced equation specification. However, we found that we would 
lose a substantial number of observations when using this estimation method and therefore decided 
against it. 
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inflation factors and found that including more than one of the five alliance 
indicators cause multicollinearity. We therefore report six different models. The 
first model does not contain any alliance variable while the remaining five models 
substitute the five alliance variables in turn. The purpose of this approach is to 
investigate how the significance of the remaining variable change accordingly 
suggesting how the alliance variables co-varies with them and how they 
individually influence PMV. 
6 Results  
Table 4 presents results for six regression models estimating the impact of 
alliances on PMV. Effects on PMV are estimated for alliances entered in the same 
year as the financing round (t) and for alliances entered the previous year (t-1). 
For all alliance types we estimate effects of having been formed under conditions 
of capital scarcity vs. sufficiency. Control variables are estimated only for year t, 
i.e. the   same year for which the PMV value is entered.  
 
*** Insert Table 4 here *** 
 
HYP. 1 predicts that Collaborative and out-licensing alliances with pharma 
partners (OUTNONSYM) entered by DDFs subject to capital scarcity lowers firm 
value in the next capital round.  
This hypothesis is tested in Model III, obtaining significant estimates for both 
conditions of capital sufficiency (OUTNONSYM) and scarcity (OUTNONSYM x 
Scar), in both cases for year (t-1). These estimates, however, have signs opposite 
to those predicted in HYP 1. In other words, capital scarcity by the present 
findings appear not to set in motion a causal cascade beginning with a weak 
bargaining position, translating into inefficient depletion of their property rights, 
in turn arguably affecting adversely their values in the subsequent financing 
round.  
HYP. 2: Since OUTNONSYMt-1 is entered alongside its interaction with Scarct-1 its 
non-interacted version picks up alliances under condition of capital sufficiency. 
Significant at the 5% level, the negative estimate for OUTNONSYMt-1 confirms 
the prediction of HYP. 2 that collaborative and out-licensing alliances with 
pharma partners (OUTNONSYM) entered by DDFs subject to capital sufficiency 
lowers firm value in the next capital round. Investors, in other words, penalise 
firms having sold rights to their drug candidates without having been financially 
compelled to do so, hence supporting the argument that in periods of capital 
sufficiency investors expect DDFs to develop their project by internal resources 
so as to stay in full control of potential future value.  
HYP. 3: The strategy alignment argument is tested in the prediction that 
collaborative and out-licensing alliances with pharma partners (OUTNONSYM) 
entered by DDFs subject to capital scarcity induce higher values in the next 
capital round compared to the effects of alliances entered subject to capital 
sufficiency. Model III obtains a negative significant estimate for OUTNONSYMt-1 
in the non-interacted form, in which it picks up alliances entered under capital 
sufficiency. In other words, a condition of capital sufficiency has a downward 
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effect on firm values. At the same time a positive significant estimate is obtained 
for the interaction of OUTNONSYMt-1 x Scarct-1, i.e. indicating a positive effect 
on firm values for the condition of capital scarcity By using the Wald tests, we 
evaluated whether entering an alliance under scarcity has a positive or negative 
combined effect. We found the combined coefficients to be insignificant 
suggesting that the negative effect of entering the alliance is neutralized when the 
firm is operating under scarcity. The combined implication of these findings is i) 
alliances entered under conditions of capital sufficiency for a DDF significantly 
lowers its value in the next financing round, ii) capital scarcity brings firm values 
to a level significantly above that induced by sufficiency whereas by itself scarcity 
induces no significant positive effects on firm values. These findings confirm 
HYP. 3.  
HYP. 4 predicting positive effects on firm value of out-licensing alliances with 
other DDFs or with upstream partners (OUTSYM) is tested in Model V. No 
significant results are obtained, and HYP. 4 is rejected.  
 
HYP.  5 predicting negative effects on firm values of complementary input-
alliances (COMPLIN)  is tested in Model IV. Model IV gives significant negative 
estimates for COMPLINt-1 entered under capital sufficiency and confirms HYP. 5 
for alliances entered under capital sufficiency. That is, in-licensing and 
collaborative alliances with other biotech firms and pharmaceutical firms 
significantly lower firm values when entered under capital sufficiency. This 
finding confirm theory stating that complementary alliances are characterised by 
the most negative effects, partly due to the potential risks of spill-overs, Investors 
especially seems to take these risks into account when DDFs enter alliances in 
periods of capital sufficiency and, hence, would have better conditions for 
developing projects in-house. 
 
HYP. 6 predicts that input alliances with upstream partners (UPSTRIN) entered 
by DDFs subject to capital scarcity induce higher firm values in the next capital 
round compared to the effects of same type of alliances entered subject to capital 
sufficiency. Model VI gives no significant estimates and HYP. 6 is rejected.  
For the controls, the following results should be noted:  
EMPL: Size, measured as the number of employees, positively and significantly 
affects firm value in all models. The correlation with PMV and individual types of 
alliances (Table 3), reveals that size and PMV are strongly correlated. 
Additionally, OUTNONSYM alliances tend to be positively correlated with size. 
The relationship between the size of the firm measuread as the number of 
employees and the PMV is rather self-evident. The more assets, the higher the 
value. The results, however, also indicates that as the firms becomes larger, the 
propensity of OUTNONSYM alliances increases. 
AGE: The age of the firm is significant in all models, indicating that by increasing 
age firm also tend to become more valuable in terms of the PMV. 
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IndDev: In all models but Model II and IV, the variable IndDev is significant and 
negative. That is, financing rounds undertaken after the investment peak in 2001 
brought firm values significantly lower than did rounds prior to the peak.  
 
SX: Positive effect of the SX variable signifies that listed firms tend to get higher 
values than non-listed firms. Significant positive signs appear for SX when entered 
alongside various types of alliances in all models, signifying a positive effect of 
being listed when the opposite effects of alliances subject to capital scarcity and 
sufficiency are accounted for.  
7 Discussion 
Several factors should be considered to account for the rejection of HYP1, which 
was designed to test the argument based on property rights theory that out-
licensing alliances with pharma-partners entered by DDFs subject to capital 
scarcity lowers their values in the next capital round. (Lerner, Shane, Tsai, 2003) 
provides the strongest evidence in favour of this property rights approach, but a 
closer look suggests that its divergence from the findings of the present study is 
not entirely contradictory.  
First, whereas Lerner et al have data tapping directly into alliance attributes 
potentially affecting firm valuations (e.g. control rights over the project) our data 
include such attributes only as a quality derived from capital scarcity. Therefore, 
unable to test if alliance attributes in our sample are similarly affected by a weak 
bargaining position, we can only infer that if that were the case, then the capital 
scarcity giving rise to that position also drives opposite effects, which more 
forcefully affect the firm values. The strategy alignment argument is proposed as 
one likely candidate for the mechanisms driving these opposite effects. We 
therefore recognise that the support obtained for the strategy alignment by the 
present findings, instead of disproving the effects of capital scarcity identified by 
Lerner et al., only allows the claim that for the present sample of DDFs effects on 
firm values, explained by the strategy alignment argument, are stronger.  
Similar implications emerge from considering differences in the time-spans 
covered by the two studies, i.e. 1980-1995 in Lerner et al., 1997-2004 in the 
present study. The literature on biotechnology (Valentine, 2003) argues that 
pharmaceutical firms to an increasing extent face a depletion of their internal 
pipelines. This challenge has become more pronounced over the last 10 year. 
DDFs increasingly hold the keys to the replenishment of the pipelines of their 
pharma-partners, and this affects the bargaining positions of the two parties. This 
shift emerged from the mid-1990s when the time-span covered in Lerner et al. 
comes to an end, and the period of the present study begins. The opposite results 
of the two studies therefore to some extent may be caused by a transformation in 
their object, rather than by a contradiction of arguments. 
The confirmation of HYP 2 (i.e. that capital sufficiency, rather than scarcity, 
adversely affects firm values) directs attention to the type of pharma-alliances we 
typically find in our data-set. Press coverage of alliances and deals made by DDFs 
with pharmaceutical firms tends to highlight a few outstanding cases where DDFs 
obtain startling up-front compensations and licensing arrangements. Undoubtedly 
such deals solicit positive investor reactions in the subsequent financing rounds 
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regardless of the condition of capital scarcity, under which they were established. 
However, underneath these few outstanding cases we find a much larger number 
of alliances, in which DDFs share rights or enter into co-development on projects 
in pre-clinical stages, characterized by considerably higher remaining uncertainty, 
corresponding to notably lower levels of compensation.  
Such more moderate deals are particularly prevalent in a young biotech industry, 
of the kind represented in the present study. Danish and Swedish DDFs tend to be 
fairly immature firms, their average age at the time of the financing rounds 
covered by our data being app. 5 years, and their average size being 21 employees 
(Table 2). By implication, a large share of the 60 outbound alliances with 
pharmaceutical firms identified in this study (Figure 2) refers to pre-clinical 
projects and to correspondingly moderate compensations to DDFs. But although 
they give rise to only moderate deals, at the same time they may rank importantly 
in the calculation of the future value potential of the DDF on which venture 
capitalists have based their investment. In the eyes of investors, we learn from the 
confirmation of HYP 2, the depletion of that future value overshadows the more 
short-term gains from the average pharma-alliance.    
The importance, from an investor perspective, of the future value potential of the 
firm over short-term gains from alliances also is brought out by the non-
significant results obtained for HYP 4 concerning out-licensing alliances with 
other biotech firms or with upstream partners (OUTSYM). Revenues from these 
alliances are generated by DDFs but without affecting firm values. Although these 
returns undoubtedly are smaller than those obtained from pharma-partners, ceteris 
paribus they would still, in more conventional lines of business, positively affect 
firm values. In the case of DDFs, however, the long-term value potential plays 
such a predominant role for investors that comparatively smaller revenue flows 
remain inconsequential for firm values.   
The same investor rationale appears in the response of investors to input alliances 
with upstream partners (UPSTRIN). Partners are principally universities, 
signifying a predominance of exploratory research in these alliances. The 
rejection of HYP 6 indicates that investors are not affected by these alliances. On 
the contrary, alliances entered with other biotech firms or pharmaceutical firms 
(COMPLIN) under capital sufficiency receive a penalty. These in-licensing and 
collaborative alliances appear to be more of a potential risk of spill-overs than a 
valuable complementary to internal competencies as indicated by the test results 
of HYP. 5. All these concerns reflect an overriding priority put by investors on 
activities directly feeding into building the value potential of the DDF.  
Concerns for value depletion as perhaps the fundamental response of investors to 
the average pharma-alliance also emerges from a closer examination of the 
findings confirming HYP 3. These findings inform us that pharma-alliances 
entered under scarcity in the next financing round indeed are capable of inducing 
firm values significantly higher than those entered under capital sufficiency. At 
the same time these upward effects do not allow scarcity-related alliances to 
induce valuations significantly above those obtained by firms without alliances. 
Essentially they neutralize the emphasis on value depletion which investors 
otherwise maintain as their general response to the average pharma-alliance.  
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This neutralizing effect, we argue, comes from the “strategy alignment argument”. 
Recognizing value depletion as the fundamental concern of investors perhaps 
brings out two separate dimensions of the strategy alignment argument. One 
dimension comes out in the claim that scarcity is the condition under which DDFs 
bring their projects to the highest possible value before they make them available 
for alliances with pharma- partners. This argument, in other words, pertains to the 
value of the project. The other dimension of the strategy alignment argument 
emphasizes the challenge confronting the top management team (TMT) of 
aligning diverse strategy processes relating to the research process, burn rates and 
the formation of a suitable partnership. Veteran managers of DDFs refer to 
precisely this alignment as being particularly demanding on the managerial 
capabilities of the TMT  (PharmaDanmark 2007). These managerial capabilities 
are brought out by pharma-alliances entered under scarcity forcefully enough so 
as to positively affect the confidence investors have in the TMT. This dimension 
of the argument, in other words, pertains to the value-generating capability of the 
TMT.  
8 Conclusions  
The first part of this paper presented empirical patterns in alliances entered by 
Danish and Swedish biotech firms specialized in drug discovery over the eight 
years from 1997 – 2004. The second part of the paper analysed effects of these 
alliances on the value of the DDF, as observed in the financing round undertaken 
by firms shortly after alliances were formed.  
Distinguishing between the value-chain position of partners and between the 
directions of the deliverables of the alliance a typology was developed of four 
main types of alliances. Effects on firm values were found only for two types of 
alliances. In the first type DDFs outsource exploratory research to university 
science. In the second type DDFs collaborate and out-license parts of their 
pipeline to large pharmaceutical firms. For both types we observed divergent 
effects on firm values of alliances formed under conditions of capital sufficiency 
as opposed to scarcity.  
Our analysis focused particularly on pharma-alliances, recognising their 
prominent role in the literature and their importance for the financial resources 
made available for the further development of DDFs.  Property rights theory has 
shaped an important strain in the literature, arguing that capital scarcity for DDFs 
undermine their bargaining position vis-à-vis  pharma-partners. This asymmetry 
produces alliances in which DDFs loose control of projects and thereby incentives 
of its TMT and value of the firm. In turn this adversely affects the value obtained 
by the venture from investors in the next financing round.  
The present findings not only fail to support this property rights argument, rather 
they give the opposite result. The general and fundamental response of investors 
to pharma alliances seems to emphasise that the potential future value of the DDF 
is depleted when parts of its pipeline is transferred to pharma partners, and the 
general effect on firm values is negative. While this is not the case, we recognise, 
for the very large, successful pharma deals attracting the attention of the business 
press, it appears as the pattern in the many smaller deals carried out under the 
radar height of the media.  
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Furthermore, capital scarcity appears as the one condition for pharma alliances to 
which investors do not respond negatively, based solely on concerns for value 
depletion. Scarcity comes out as a condition for alliance formation which 
neutralises the preoccupation of investors with value depletion. The explanation 
offered in the paper is that each advance in a drug development project notably 
increases its value, hence incentivizing the DDF to strain its financial resources to 
take the project as far as possible before out-licensing it to a pharma partner. For 
this reason, capital scarcity emerges as the condition, under which a DDF 
maximizes the profitability of a subsequent pharma alliance. Concurrently with 
financial resources approaching exhaustion, the DDF must attract the interest of a 
pharma-partner with requisite needs. Together these requirements translate into an 
exceedingly complex alignment of burn rates, research achievements and search 
for best match amongst potential pharma partners. This confluence of diverse 
challenges, requiring highly coordinated management, ranks among the ultimate 
tests of TMTs of  biotech firms.  
Projects offered for alliances under scarcity therefore are developed to become 
more valuable, as compared to alliances subject to sufficiency. In addition, 
scarcity-related alliances provide evidence of strong managerial capabilities on 
part of the TMT of the venture. Both the higher project value, and the stronger 
confidence in the TMT are likely explanations for the comparative higher values 
of DDFs induced by alliances entered under capital scarcity.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 Overview of variables 
 
Dependent variable 
• Firm valuation measured as Postmoney value for year t (PMV) 
  
Independent variables 
• Total number of all types of alliances formed by the firm in year t and t-1 (NEWALLt and 
NEWALLt-1) 
• Dummy coded 1 if alliances entered entail an Upstream Input alliance in year t and t-1 
(UPSTRINt and UPSTRINt-1) 
• Dummy coded 1 if alliances entered entail a Symmetrical Output alliance (OUTSYMt and 
OUTSYM t-1) 
• Dummy coded 1 if alliances entered entail a Complementarity Input alliance (COMPLINt and 
COMPLIN t-1) 
• Dummy coded 1 if alliances entered entail a Non-symmetrical Output alliance 
(OUTNONSYMt and OUTNONSYM t-1) 
• Dummy coded 1 if the first pharma alliance was entered in year t or t-1 by the company (PHft 
and PHft-1) 
• Dummy coded 1 for scarcity and 0 for sufficiency in year t-1 (Scarct-1) 
 
Control variables 
• Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm is listed on the stock exchange in year t (SX) 
• Dummy variable coded 1 if ARI is measured subsequent to 2001 (IndDev) 
• Firm size effect measured as number of employees in year t (Empl) 
• Firm age effect measured as the age of firms in year t (Age) 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
  Mean S.D. Min Max
log(PMV) 18.46 1.42 14.66 21.63
NEWALLt 0.71 1.29 0.00 7.00
NEWALLt-1 0.68 1.21 0.00 6.00
NEWALLt-1 * Scarct-1 0.35 1.04 0.00 6.00
OUTNONSYMt 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
OUTNONSYMt-1 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
OUTNONSYMt-1 * Scarct-1 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
COMPLINt 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
COMPLINt-1 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
COMPLINt-1 * Scarct-1 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
OUTSYMt 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
OUTSYMt-1 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
OUTSYMt-1 * Scarct-1 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
UPSTRINt 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
UPSTRINt-1 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
UPSTRINt-1 * Scarct-1 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Scarct-1 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
PHft 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
PHft-1 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
PHft-1 * Scarct-1 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
SX 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
IndDev 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
log(Empl)^ 2.29 1.16 0.00 5.15
log(Age)^ 1.36 0.79 0.00 2.89
^ Mean and Std.Dev. for Empl and Age    
N=96     
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Table 3 (a) Correlation matrix 
    log(PMV)   NEWALLt   NEWALLt-1   
NEWALLt-1 * 
Scarct-1 OUTNONSYMt OUTNONSYMt-1 
OUTNONSYMt-1 
* Scarct-1 COMPLINt   COMPLINt   
COMPLINt-1 * 
Scarct-1 
1 log(PMV)                     
2 NEWALLt 0.247 **                   
3 NEWALLt-1 0.245 ** 0.236 **                 
4 NEWALLt-1 * Scarct-1 0.151  0.236 ** 0.764 ***               
5 OUTNONSYMt 0.261 *** 0.503 *** 0.205 ** 0.114              
6 OUTNONSYMt-1 0.262 *** 0.216 ** 0.425 *** 0.299 *** 0.021            
7 OUTNONSYMt-1 * Scarct-1 0.221 ** 0.321 *** 0.446 *** 0.577 *** 0.135  0.596 ***         
8 COMPLINt 0.146  0.539 *** 0.175 * 0.262 *** 0.144  0.045  0.162        
9 COMPLINt 0.038  0.233 ** 0.442 *** 0.39 *** 0.180 * 0.228 ** 0.294 *** 0.228 **     
10 COMPLINt-1 * Scarct-1 -0.050  0.240 ** 0.324 *** 0.479 *** 0.124  0.162  0.353 *** 0.291 *** 0.851 ***   
11 OUTSYMt 0.056  0.373 *** 0.013  0.080  0.100  0.126  0.262 *** 0.314 *** 0.236 *** 0.291 *** 
12 OUTSYMt-1 -0.044  0.147  0.342 *** 0.445 *** 0.189 * 0.220 ** 0.393 *** -0.044  0.165  0.203 ** 
13 OUTSYMt-1 * Scarct-1 -0.044  0.147  0.342 *** 0.445 *** 0.189 * 0.220 ** 0.393 *** -0.044  0.165  0.203 ** 
14 UPSTRINt -0.020  0.530 *** 0.120  -0.084  0.219 ** 0.021  -0.061  0.144  0.077  0.007  
15 UPSTRINt-1 -0.010  0.086  0.520 *** 0.298 *** 0.180 * 0.114  0.113  0,000  0.143  0.095  
16 UPSTRINt-1 * Scarct-1 -0.004  0.017  0.414 *** 0.556 *** 0.074  0.099  0.227 ** -0.071  0.195 * 0.246 ** 
17 Scarct-1 -0.146  0.079  -0.009  0.323 *** -0.021  -0.094  0.169 * 0.132  0.166  0.302 *** 
18 PHft 0.127  0.126  -0.054  -0.081  0.380 *** -0.071  -0.042  -0.071  0.053  -0.075  
19 PHft-1 0.183 * 0.064  0.275 *** 0.176 * 0.036  0.350 *** -0.050  0.060  -0.106  -0.090  
20 PHft-1 * Scarct-1 0.085  0.033  0.342 *** 0.445 *** -0.050  -0.044  -0.026  0.220 ** -0.055  -0.047  
21 SX 0.545 *** 0.209 ** 0.368 *** 0.130  0.199 * 0.128  0.123  0.365 *** 0.260 *** -0.004  
22 IndDev -0.135  0.043  0.097  0.077  -0.077  -0.031  -0.055  0.062  0.116  0.077  
23 log(Empl) 0.670 *** 0.332 *** 0.140  0.178 * 0.306 *** 0.297 *** 0.351 *** 0.051  0.155  0.212 ** 
24 log(Age) 0.377 *** 0.044   0.155   -0.060   0.113   0.191 * 0.136   0.066   0.046   -0.057   
 
26
 
Table 3 (b) Correlation matrix 
    OUTSYMt   OUTSYMt-1   
OUTSYMt-1 * 
Scarct-1 UPSTRINt   UPSTRINt-1   
UPSTRINt-1 * 
Scarct-1 Scarct-1   PHft   PHft-1   PHft-1 * Scarct-1 
1 log(PMV)                     
2 NEWALLt                     
3 NEWALLt-1                     
4 NEWALLt-1 * Scarct-1                     
5 OUTNONSYMt                     
6 OUTNONSYMt-1                     
7 OUTNONSYMt-1 * Scarct-1                    
8 COMPLINt                     
9 COMPLINt                     
10 COMPLINt-1 * Scarct-1                     
11 OUTSYMt                     
12 OUTSYMt-1 -0.030                    
13 OUTSYMt-1 * Scarct-1 -0.030  1,000                  
14 UPSTRINt 0.100  -0.005  -0.050                
15 UPSTRINt-1 -0.079  0.165  0.165  0.180 *             
16 UPSTRINt-1 * Scarct-1 -0.049  0.294 *** 0.294 *** -0.080  0.620 ***           
17 Scarct-1 0.196 * 0.137  0.137  -0.021  -0.087  0.220 **         
18 PHft -0.049  -0.034  -0.034  -0.080  -0.089  -0.055  -0.156        
19 PHft-1 -0.058  -0.041  -0.041  0.036  -0.106  -0.066  -0.138  -0.066      
20 PHft-1 * Scarct-1 -0.030  -0.021  -0.021  -0.050  -0.055  -0.034  0.137  -0.034  0.520 ***   
21 SX 0.089  -0.052  -0.052  0.091  0.062  -0.084  -0.121  0.063  0.025  0.177 * 
22 IndDev -0.021  0.075  0.075  0.091  0.116  0.120  -0.019  0.005  0.144  0.075  
23 log(Empl) 0.218 ** 0.120  0.120  -0.007  -0.072  0.058  0.136  0.155  0.025  -0.045  
24 log(Age) -0.105   -0.060   -0.060   0.003   -0.024   -0.242 ** -0.250 ** 0.104   0.042   -0.073   
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01                    
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Table 3 (c) Correlation matrix 
    SX   IndDev   log(Empl)   log(Age)   
1 log(PMV)         
2 NEWALLt         
3 NEWALLt-1         
4 NEWALLt-1 * Scarct-1         
5 OUTNONSYMt         
6 OUTNONSYMt-1         
7 OUTNONSYMt-1 * Scarct-1        
8 COMPLINt         
9 COMPLINt         
10 COMPLINt-1 * Scarct-1         
11 OUTSYMt         
12 OUTSYMt-1         
13 OUTSYMt-1 * Scarct-1         
14 UPSTRINt         
15 UPSTRINt-1         
16 UPSTRINt-1 * Scarct-1         
17 Scarct-1         
18 PHft         
19 PHft-1         
20 PHft-1 * Scarct-1         
21 SX         
22 IndDev -0.057        
23 log(Empl) 0.119  -0.079      
24 log(Age) 0.335 *** 0.018   0.198 * 1,000   
 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01        
 
 
Table 4. Models  
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
NEWALLt   -0.172 *   
   [0.093]   
NEWALLt-1   -0.421 ***   
   [0.115]   
NEWALLt-1 * Scarct-1   0.417 ***   
   [0.128]   
OUTNONSYMt   -0.271   
   [0.299]   
OUTNONSYMt-1   -0.896 **   
   [0.383]   
OUTNONSYMt-1 * Scarct-1  1.066 **   
   [0.439]   
COMPLINt  -0.323   
  [0.249]   
COMPLINt-1  -1.118 ***   
  [0.385]   
COMPLINt-1 * Scarct-1  0.658   
   [0.481]   
OUTSYMt  0.153  
  [0.465]  
OUTSYMt-1  0.071  
  [0.556]  
OUTSYMt-1 * Scarct-1  Dropped  
     
UPSTRINt    -0.458
    [0.452]
UPSTRINt-1    -0.584
    [0.532]
UPSTRINt-1 * Scarct-1    0.562
     [0.627]
Scarct-1 -0.253  -0.293 -0.290 -0.207 -0.258  -0.255
 [0.228]  [0.245] [0.233] [0.239] [0.246]  [0.239]
PHft -0.402  -0.238 -0.131 -0.066 -0.402  -0.443
 [0.479]  [0.312] [0.352] [0.265] [0.487]  [0.475]
PHft-1 0.226  0.473 0.885 *** 0.398 0.221  -0.014
 [0.328]  [0.329] [0.321] [0.237] [0.336]  [0.427]
PHft-1 * Scarct-1 0.792 * -0.038 -0.025 0.361 0.807  0.681
 [0.468]  [0.597] [0.581] [0.420] [0.488]  [0.545]
SX 1.461 ** 1.581 ** 1.492 * 1.553 ** 1.470 ** 1.606 **
 [0.663]  [0.648] [0.752] [0.651] [0.691]  [0.670]
IndDev -0.743 * -0.634 -0.794 * -0.573 -0.760 * -0.724 *
 [0.389]  [0.408] [0.445] [0.372] [0.403]  [0.422]
log(Empl) 0.615 ** 0.720 *** 0.463 ** 0.607 *** 0.606 ** 0.453 *
 [0.238]  [0.216] [0.225] [0.148] [0.250]  [0.249]
log(Age) 0.800 ** 0.739 ** 0.859 ** 0.833 *** 0.817 ** 0.848 **
 [0.345]  [0.345] [0.369] [0.300] [0.340]  [0.395]
Constant 16.504 *** 16.517 *** 16.853 *** 16.393 *** 16.508 *** 16.894 ***
  [0.566]   [0.562] [0.607] [0.516]  [0.626]   [0.614]
     
N 96  96 96 96 96  96
Groups 49  49 49 49 49  49
R2 0.556  0.638 0.579 0.608 0.547  0.572
F 5.506 *** 5.760 *** 30.944 *** 9.915 *** 4.287 *** 3.802 ***
max VIF 1.60   4.04 2.56 6.26  1.61   2.23
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, SE in parentheses   
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